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ABSTRACT This article presents a recent disconcerting event that took place at a
rehabilitative nursing home in Tel Aviv in light of Israel’s Dying Patient Law, which
came into effect in 2005. It probes the double effect doctrine as it is relevant to the case
at hand and the role of the medical profession and of the family in making decisions at
the end of life, and it argues that patients who express a wish to die should receive a
comprehensive care assessment that addresses their physical and mental condition be-
fore rushing to provide lethal medication. The article concludes by offering some
guidelines to help practitioners address the intricate questions they face when patients
ask to die.
Case Study
SC was an 80-year-old Israeli woman. She suffered from multiple chronic con-
ditions, including heart disease, pulmonary congestion, chronic leukemia, dia-
betes, and high blood pressure. She received medication to treat her medical
condition. Her pressing problems were shortness of breath and severe pain in her
left leg, the result of poor blood circulation. SC resided in a rehabilitative nurs-
ing home in Tel Aviv. One night she could not sleep. She sat on her bed, unable
Department of Politics, University of Hull, Cottingham Road, Hull, HU6 7RX, United Kingdom.
E-mail: R.Cohen-Almagor@hull.ac.uk.
In memory of my mother, Sarah Cohen (1930–2011).
The author thanks Shimon Glick,Asa Kasher,Avi Ohry, Shlomit Pery,Charles Sprung, and Avraham
Steinberg for their constructive comments, suggestions, and criticisms.
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, volume 54, number 4 (autumn 2011):578–94
© 2011 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
11_PBM54.4cohen 578–94:02_51.3schwartz 320–  10/6/11  11:10 AM  Page 578
to lie down, and screamed with pain.A nurse came and gave her some analgesics
with no relief of her pain.The following day the institution’s social worker vis-
ited her. SC sat in the dining hall with her older sister CA.The social worker
asked SC how she felt. SC replied she did not feel well. She was tired and in
severe pain.The social worker asked:What do you want? SC answered laconi-
cally: To die.The social worker then proposed to categorize SC as a “terminal
patient” with the implication that SC would receive from that time only hospice
care—that is to say, SC would receive only pain relief medication and no treat-
ment aimed to heal or improve her health. SC agreed. She signed a document
to that effect, and her sister CA served as a witness. Shortly thereafter, SC re-
ceived significant dosages of morphine. She lost her appetite, became bedridden,
and quickly lost the ability to communicate. SC became incoherent, confused,
and hallucinated. SC, who was not a dying patient, quickly became a dying
patient.
This case study poses some serious legal, medical, and ethical questions. In or-
der to address these, I will first reflect on Israel’s Dying Patient Law.
The Dying Patient Law
In 2000, the Israeli Ministry of Health assembled a group of 59 professionals to
draft a law to administer end-of-life decision making.The Dying Patient Com-
mittee, known also as the Steinberg Committee after its Chair, Professor Avra-
ham Steinberg, worked for two years and submitted its recommendations and
draft law to the government. The Committee considered titling the law “The
Terminal Patient Law” but the philosophers of the committee objected, arguing
that the word terminal does not serve the best interests of the patient.They in-
sisted on a lucid end-of-life language, on terminology that would make it clear
that the law was applicable only to patients whose death is near.
The Dying Patient Law came into effect on December 6, 2005.The law ap-
plies only to patients who were categorized by a qualified physician as “dying,”
and who have specifically expressed a wish regarding their treatment, either its
prolongation or cessation.The law assumes that the majority of people do not
wish to die. All Committee members—including physicians, ethicists, and reli-
gious authorities—were of the opinion that patients tend to prefer life with
medical challenges over death.1 The law aimed to strike a balance between the
principles of value of life and autonomy, based upon the value system of Israel as
a Jewish-democratic state. The law stipulates that decisions concerning dying
patients should be based on the patient’s medical condition, her wishes, and the
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degree of her suffering. A “dying patient” is defined as a person who suffers from
an incurable illness and who has no more than six months to live even with
medical therapy; the last period of two weeks of expected life is defined as the
final stage (Dying Patient Law, Chapter D, section 8).The law specifies the means
to guarantee that patients have explicitly wished to die. In instances where no
instructions have been left, a guardian or a person close to the patient is allowed
to make a statement regarding her or his desires.The statement is only advisory
and not binding.The law further stipulates that minors under the age of 17 will
be represented by their parents on the issue of ceasing treatment. If a conflict be-
tween the parents and the physician arises, a committee will rule on the matter
(Dying Patient Law, Chapter D, section 28; Barilan 2007).
The law only pertains to patients who are competent or were once compe-
tent. It does not apply to post-coma unawareness (PCU) patients, those suffer-
ing from severe pain and suffering, non-terminally ill but seriously malformed
neonates, or never competent patients (Cohen-Almagor 1997).2 The law also
prohibits withdrawal of continuous care, distinguishing between intermittent
and continuous care. The distinction was made due to disagreements between
the philosophers and the religious members of the Committee on the legitimacy
of withholding and withdrawing treatment.While the philosophers thought that
there was no morally significant difference between withholding and withdraw-
ing treatment, all representatives of religious denominations, without exception,
strongly opposed withdrawal of treatment.Thus the distinction between inter-
mittent and continuous care was aimed to address an important aspect of Jewish
(Halachic) law. Under Jewish law, patients cannot be disconnected from ventila-
tors (“killing”).
However, there is no problem in not connecting them to such machines (“let-
ting die”).“Continuous treatment” is defined as any form of treatment that is es-
sentially uninterrupted, so that there is no clear distinction between the end of
one cycle and the beginning of another. “Intermittent treatment” is defined as
treatment that begins and ends in well-defined cycles. Mechanical ventilation is
an example of continuous treatment, while intubation, surgery, blood transfu-
sions, dialysis, chemotherapy, radiotherapy, or antibiotics are examples of inter-
mittent treatment. According to the Dying Patient Law, continuous medical
treatment may only be terminated for the purpose of medical treatment.While
a patient may request not to renew discrete treatment that has been interrupted,
he cannot request to withdraw continuous treatment (Gross and Ravitsky 2003;
Ravitsky 2005; Steinberg 2001).
The law also distinguishes between primary medical care (medical care to
treat the terminal disease itself) and ancillary care (antibiotics for infections, food
580
Raphael Cohen-Almagor
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
2PCU is also termed PVS, persistent vegetative state. I object to this term on ethical grounds and
do not believe it serves the patient’s best interests. See Bedell et al. 2004; Cohen-Almagor 1997,
2000b.
11_PBM54.4cohen 578–94:02_51.3schwartz 320–  10/6/11  11:10 AM  Page 580
and fluids, etc.). Incompetent terminally ill patients have the right to refuse any
primary treatment but may not refuse ancillary treatment, while end-state ter-
minally ill patients may refuse either primary or ancillary treatments. Competent
patients can refuse food and fluids; incompetent patients will receive food and
fluids despite previous contrary statements, This is because food and fluids are
regarded as a basic need of any human being; they are not perceived as treatment.
unless the attending physicians determine that food and fluids cause harm or suf-
fering. Furthermore, the law explicitly prohibits euthanasia and physician-
assisted suicide (PAS); (Dying Patient Law, Chapter D, sections 19–20). Com-
mittee member endorsed euthanasia, and only one member supported PAS.The
prevailing view was that Israel as a Jewish-democratic state should not allow
physicians to practice either. In the future, the prohibition may be reconsidered.
The law also requires the appointment of a senior physician as the responsi-
ble health-care provider.The senior physician’s tasks are to establish the medical
situation of the patient, to analyze all relevant facts and documents together with
all other experts and decision-makers, to establish the wishes of the patient; to
formulate a detailed plan of treatment, to document all the decisions in a com-
prehensible and explicit manner, and to inform all relevant parties of the deci-
sions. Decisions should be based on medical facts and the patient’s wishes (Stein-
berg and Sprung 2006, p. 1236).
Finally, the Dying Patient Law provides for advance directives. It establishes
detailed mechanisms for taking into account the calculated wishes of the now
incompetent dying patient. These mechanisms include a detailed form to be
filled out by the person with the aid of a physician or nurse; renewal of the state-
ment every five years; reevaluation of the statement when diagnosed with a seri-
ous illness, with the aid of an expert physician; and the establishment of a
national pool of advanced medical directives (Dying Patient Law, Chapter E).
Relevance of the Dying Patient Law
to the Case at Hand
To what extent is the Dying Patient Law relevant to the case at hand? SC did
not suffer from any incurable disease: all her ailments were treatable. No senior
physician was present in her discussion with the social worker, verifying that she
wished to die. No senior physician advised her of a detailed plan of treatment. It
seems that her decision was probably related to her continued suffering from
pain which was not adequately treated and probably could have been if given the
chance.Although the law stipulates that the attending physician should do what-
ever possible to relieve the patient’s pain and suffering by medication, palliative
care, or psychological means, no psychological treatment was offered to SC, and
no palliative care specialist saw her.
A few weeks prior to the fatal discussion that SC had with the social worker,
she completed another form. In that form, SC designated her son RC as her
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medical guardian with whom the nursing home medical team should consult
should she become incompetent. As RC resided in England, the social worker
advised SC to nominate another person, an Israeli resident, as a second medical
guardian.This is because the social worker argued that medical directives should
be signed in person.They cannot be faxed or delivered orally over the phone.
SC then added her sister CA as a second guardian, stipulating that in any event
CA needed to consult with SC’s son, RC, on any decision concerning SC’s
health. Copies of this document, with the specific stipulations, were made and
given to SC, RC, CA, and the social worker.Yet, only a few weeks later SC was
advised to sign another document. RC was not informed or advised, in absolute
disregard for the previous agreement and signed advanced directives.Thus, the
law was not upheld.
The Double Effect Doctrine
The procedure that the nursing home pursued is known as the “double effect
doctrine.”The Dying Patient Law says nothing about the double effect doctrine,
despite its practice in hospitals and nursing homes.Very little deliberation was
conducted in the Committee about the doctrine.The ethical concept of double
effect is used to justify medical treatment designed to relieve suffering where
death is supposedly an unintended, though foreseeable, consequence. It comes
from the double effect doctrine developed by Roman Catholic moral theolo-
gians in the Middle Ages, as a response to situations requiring actions in which
it is impossible to avoid all harmful consequences.The doctrine makes intention
in the mind of the doctor a crucial factor in judging the moral correctness of
the doctor’s action, because of the Roman Catholic teaching that it is never per-
missible to “intend” the death of an “innocent person,” one who has not for-
feited the right to life by the way he or she behaves, for example, by threatening
or taking the lives of others (Anderson 2007; Boyle 2008; Cohen-Almagor 2001;
Kamm 1999; McIntyre 2001; Quill, Dresser, and Brock 1997; Sulmasy 1999;
Woodward 2001).
The double effect reasoning may permit an act causing good and evil when
it meets the following conditions:
1. The act considered independently of its evil effect is not in itself wrong.
It must be morally good or at least indifferent;
2. The agent intends the good and does not intend the evil either as an end
or as a means; however, the agent may permit the bad effect;
3. Application of the doctrine presuppose that some kind of proportionality
condition has been satisfied: the agent has proportionately grave reasons
for acting, addressing his relevant obligations, comparing the conse-
quences, and, considering the necessity of the evil, exercising due care
to eliminate or mitigate it;
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4. The good effect must flow from the action at least immediately as the
bad effect;
5. The good effect must be sufficiently desirable to compensate for the
allowing of the bad effect (Cavanaugh 2006).
In other words, the double effect doctrine applies if the desired outcome is
judged to be “good” (relief of suffering); the “bad” outcome (death of patient) is
not intended; the “good” outcome is not achieved by means of the “bad”; and
the “good” outcome outweighs the “bad.” However, both the intention and the
proportionality presuppositions are problematic. It is hard to know, or to prove,
what is the doctor’s intention, and the issue of proportionality is tricky, as “pro-
portionate” medication is not easy to evaluate.The double effect doctrine is a
practical way to deal with severely ill patients. Some physicians prescribe large
doses of medication, knowing that suffering will be lessened but also that life
may be shortened.They feel comfortable with what they are doing: they are not
breaking the law; they are acting in accordance with their medical understand-
ing and providing solace to suffering patients. However, the double effect doc-
trine might not be altogether sincere, because there is no clear-cut distinction
between treatment administered to relive pain and suffering and treatment in-
tended to shorten the dying process.
A recent study found a striking ambiguity and uncertainty regarding inten-
tions among doctors. Some were explicit in describing a gray area between pal-
liation and euthanasia, or a continuum between the two. Not one of the respon-
dents was consistent in distinguishing between a foreseen death and an intended
death. A major theme was that “slow euthanasia” may be more psychologically
acceptable to doctors than active voluntary euthanasia by injection, partly be-
cause the former would usually only result in a small loss of time for patients al-
ready very close to death, but also because of the desirable ambiguities sur-
rounding causation and intention when an infusion of analgesics and sedatives is
used (Douglas, Kerridge and Ankeny 2008; see also British Medical Journal 2008;
Sheldon 2009; Sprung et al. 2008; Sykes and Thorns 2003).
In the case at hand, the side effect of hastening death was an inevitable or at
least likely result of the administration of opioids in order to relieve SC’s pain,
not an unwelcomed side effect of providing pain relief in the context of pallia-
tive care. However, the intention was to kill the patient, because the patient
wished to die and the medical team apparently thought that there was no point
in prolonging her life. SC confirmed this later on in a private conversation.Thus,
the double effect doctrine was misapplied in this case, because less harmful alter-
natives were available, the intention was not merely to relieve pain, and hasten-
ing death was done prematurely, out of proportion to the medical condition of
the patient.
SC was a determined, strong-willed person, very energetic and active. Until a
few weeks before, she had resided in her own apartment in Tel Aviv, catering for
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herself and her personal helper. Overall, she led an independent life. She used to
cook, shop, travel by public transportation, play bridge, go to restaurants, meet
family and friends. Suddenly she found herself confined to a rehabilitative nurs-
ing home, no longer able to climb the stairs to her apartment on the second
floor. She could hardly walk, moved about only by a wheelchair, and had to wear
an oxygen mask. She found it difficult to cope and to accept the debilitating
change. Loneliness, bitterness, and pain became more common than peace, tran-
quility, and joy.What she needed was psychological counseling that could help
her find new meanings in life and a way out of her depression. But instead of
appropriate counseling to improve her quality of life and her general mood, the
social worker rushed to advise hospice care, which was bound to lead to her
death, a death she wished.
The Role of Medical Professionals
The rehabilitative nursing home where SC was residing did not have an in-
house psychologist.The social worker assumed this role as well, despite the fact
that she did not have any qualifications to provide counseling and appropriate
psychological care for patients.This was a major omission that should have been
corrected.The nursing home is considered one of the best in the country. Pa-
tients there pay a lot of money to receive private care and therapy, but the reha-
bilitation model is confined only to the physical aspects of the body—the men-
tal and spiritual aspects are neglected.There are strong links between mind and
body; caring for one cannot be done adequately without addressing the other.
Both aspects of care—physical and mental—are crucial for successful treatment.
The astonishing thing was that SC voiced her death wish only once, and this
was enough for the social worker.The role of the social worker as a facilitator is
to create an open, safe, caring and supportive space for the patient. But “sup-
portive” does not mean to support all that the patient wants without any ques-
tions. There was no argument, no debate, no other choices offered; no asking or
evaluating whether SC was depressed and why she wished to end her life. SC
expressed a wish to die and then made her fatal choice to accept only hospice
care, which meant morphine. I believe that the social worker consulted senior
physicians, but none came to speak to SC. No medical professional ever ex-
plained her medical condition to SC, outlining the possible options and courses
for treatment, and what could be done to address her needs and concerns. In-
stead of providing reassurances in the value of life, the social worker was quick
to agree to terminate the healing treatment.
This situation was a clear violation of Israel’s Patient’s Rights Act (1996),
which established the right of patients to be informed of diagnosis, prognosis and
treatment related to the medical condition.The Act obligates the patient’s physi-
cian to provide the medical information. Although SC agreed to accept only
hospice care, she did not fully understand the implications of her consent.
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Furthermore, patients cannot be said to give informed consent when they are
very depressed, very frail, or confused. Thus, the short conversation with the
social worker at the end of which she signed the fatal document cannot be
described as one in which the patient gave informed consent (Brennan, 1991;
Faden and Beauchamp 1986; Grisso and Applebaum 1998; Maclean 2009; Man-
son and O’Neill 2007; O’Neill 2003; Switankowsky 1998;Wear 1998). No med-
ical professional provided her hope and assurance that she would be able to over-
come the physical challenges.This was a mockery of the healing process and of
a careful decision-making process. It is shocking that such a quick procedure
could happen in Israel, a country known for its rigorous care and intensive treat-
ment at the end of life.
Medical professionals should resort to the language of hope, especially when
dealing with older patients with multiple chronic conditions. The language of
hope includes various attributes, among them positive expectations, personal
qualities, spirituality, patient’s goals, comfort, help/caring, interpersonal relation-
ships, control, one’s legacy, and life review (Johnson 2007). Already vulnerable
when they learn they have a life-threatening disease or chronic illness, patients
can feel bewildered.The power of direct communication, of choices offered, of
the language one is using, is profound.The way options are presented can have
detrimental effects on the decisions patients make. Indeed, efforts have been
made across the medical community to grapple with the language and ethics of
hope. A consensus is emerging that all patients need hope, and that doctors are
obligated to offer it, in some form or another (Contreras and Kennedy 2009;
Hoffman 2005; Nathan 2010). In The Anatomy of Hope, Jerome Groopman
(2003) forcefully asserts:“Clear-eyed hope gives us the courage to confront our
circumstances and the capacity to surmount them. For all my patients, hope, true
hope, has proved as important as any medication I might prescribe or any pro-
cedure I might perform” (p. xiv).
I believe in phenomenology, that we shape our lives by the words we choose.
The invocation of concepts and the terminology we use have significant impli-
cations for the care of patients. The medical professionals at the rehabilitation
nursing home used the exact language that members of the Steinberg Commit-
tee dismissed. Offering to define a patient as “terminal” does not serve the
patient’s best interest.When a patient is categorized as terminal, the message is
one of surrender, of despair. It may seem that the medical professionals are
counting the patient’s days and are discouraging her from fighting for her life.SC
asked to die and immediately was offered to be categorized as “terminal” by a
social worker, not even by a qualified physician. This was travesty of adequate
medical care.
The medical professional’s task is not to hold a clock over the patient’s head
and count his days.When the destiny of patients is in the hands of medical pro-
fessionals who seem to have given up, patients cease looking to their caregivers
for assistance. Loss of hope diminishes the will to fight for life. I am not saying
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that medical professionals should lie: they must report the medical situation accu-
rately to the patients and their beloved people, and not raise false hopes. But they
also should not smother the power of life by categorizing patients in terms that
may weaken their will to live. (See Cohen-Almagor 2000a, 2000b; Derse 2000.)
In Garry Lee v. Oregon (1995), the court said that even for physicians who spe-
cialize in treating a terminal disease, no precise definition of “terminal” is med-
ically or legally possible, since only in hindsight is it known with certainty when
someone is going to die.And as the Ninth Circuit Court noted in Compassion in
Dying (49 F. 3d, 1995, p. 590), the terminally ill category is “inherently unstable.”
Moral Conduct, Immoral Conduct, and Amoral Conduct
There is a distinction between moral conduct, immoral conduct, and amoral
conduct. Moral conduct perceives patients in the Kantian sense as ends rather than
means, treating them with dignity, care, and respect.An objective end, Immanuel
Kant (1785) explains, is one for which there can be substituted no other end, for
otherwise nothing of absolute value would be found anywhere (Jost and Wuerth
2011).We respect patients as autonomous human beings who exercise self-deter-
mination. Each individual is perceived as a bearer of rights and a source of claims
against other persons, able to make decisions as a free agent. To regard others
with respect is to respect their right to make decisions, regardless of our opin-
ions of them. So long as the patient does not harm others, we respect her rights
as a person, even if we disagree with her specific decisions and choices.
Immoral conduct is one that is blatantly uncaring, disrespectful, and undignified.
Immoral decisions and conduct are in opposition to what is deemed right and
ethical.Amoral conduct is practiced when people are not aware that they transgress
ethical boundaries.They are oblivious to ethical standards as no one ever taught
them the philosophical and ethical skills required for the job.They are not sen-
sitive to the fact that their conduct may have deleterious effects on others.
My own research over the past 20 years in seven countries and dozens of hos-
pitals and medical centers shows that a great deal of the medical professional’s
conduct is amoral in nature. Many medical professionals are superficially familiar
with their professional ethical code of practice, as they receive only limited train-
ing in it and fail to fully comprehend the intricate philosophical layers underpin-
ning the code.Were they to receive adequate education, pointing to the ethical
issues at hand, making them aware of moral quandaries and ways to address and
resolve them, the situation could be very different. Medical schools should invest
in teaching, planning, and developing medical ethics courses and communication
skills programs in undergraduate, residency, and continuing medical education, in
order to shape new role-models for the next generation of medical professionals.
We need to create a culture of compassion, empathy, and honesty, compassion-
ately diffuse distress and despair, and effectively address systemic barriers to care
as they arise (Heritage and Maynard 2006; Kurtz, Silverman and Draper 2005;
Sears 2010;Wright, Sparks and O’Hair 2008). Most importantly, we need to edu-
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cate physicians to invest time in their patients, to sit (not stand) with them, talk
to them at eye level, explain their condition to them in language they fathom, and
understand their concerns, fears, wishes, and motivations.
The Dying Patient Law requires certain procedural formalities regarding
medical directives. The form must be signed in the presence of two impartial
witnesses. In this case, there was one witness, CA, who clearly was not impartial.
The form also should be filled in only after the signatory has received medical
information from a qualified doctor or registered nurse, who must write down
the essence of the information (Dying Patient Law, Chapter E, section 32). SC
received no detailed information about her condition from anyone. She suffered
for weeks from pain in her leg, but no substantive treatment was given to her de-
signed to heal the leg. Care is the bedrock of medical practice, but all that SC
was given was pain-relief medication.
SC’s younger son, RC, called his mother from abroad every day, sometimes
more than once a day.When he noticed that something was wrong, that he was
unable to communicate with his mother as before, he enquired about her con-
dition with the medical staff. No one told him what was going on.At one point,
SC told him she was about to die. Alarmed, he called the nurse and asked why
his mother spoke in this fashion.The nurse, in response, told him that SC was
fine: she seemed to be happy, laughing, eating, and entertaining company. No
word was uttered about the new morphine regime.
RC called the attending physician, Dr. N, who described his mother’s condi-
tion as “stable.” Dr. N did not tell him of the new morphine treatment. RC dis-
covered this only a few days later, upon arriving in Israel and after his mother
had already left the nursing home.
The Role of the Family
SC had two sons. Her elder,YC, resided not far from Tel Aviv. He had problem-
atic relationships with his mother and worked hard as an independent salesman.
He visited his mother once a week. Her younger son, RC, had a close relation-
ships with his mother but, as noted, he lived abroad.Apart from him, the closest
person SC had was her sister, CA. However, CA was 83 years old, with her own
health problems, including severe back problems that inhibited her free move-
ment. CA was put in a very uncomfortable situation. On the one hand, she felt
obliged to visit her close sister. On the other hand, each visit was quite difficult.
To visit SC, she needed to take a bus, and then walk with her cane. Her con-
science did not allow her to remain at home, but her physical abilities were dete-
riorating. Aiding her sister did not help her own health.
When SC approached CA and said she wanted to die, CA did not try to dis-
suade her. She was always willing to help her younger sister. SC asked her not to
tell anyone: it was supposed to be their secret, conspired with the social worker.
SC thought this was for the better. Her older son was not that interested in her;
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the other, who was interested, was far away and led his own life with his family.
SC found little meaning in life. She explained this to CA, who, instead of pro-
viding solace and meaning in life, told her sister: I will join you. She legitimized
SC’s request and encouraged her to go ahead with her plan. As SC wanted to
keep this secret, she had no qualms hiding this development from RC, despite
her written obligation to him and the document she had signed in which she
pledged to consult and advise him of any medical development relating to his
mother.
In many respects, SC put her sister in an impossible situation. RC used to call
his aunt CA for updates on a regular basis.Going ahead with the plan meant hid-
ing this development from him, which would destroy the trust between them.
But if CA refused her sister, that would entail a clash, something CA wanted to
avoid. After some hesitation, she cooperated with her sister. This episode illus-
trates how dangerous it is to rely on one close relative for such fateful decisions.
CA had her own partisan interests that were germane to the case but that did
not serve the patient’s best interest. Being close to the patient does not necessar-
ily mean that the patient’s best interests are being served.
In some respects, this case is reminiscent of that addressed In the Matter of
Spring (1979) in the United States.Spring involved an incompetent person whose
wife petitioned the court for an order that hemodialysis treatments, which were
sustaining the life of the ward, be terminated.The Springs had been married for
more than 55 years.Their son had lived for more than 15 years across the street
from his parents’ house and had visited them virtually every day during that
time.The wife and son had actively cared for the patient’s needs since the onset
of his precipitous physical and mental deterioration, although the burden that he
had imposed upon his family after he developed kidney failure was cumbersome.
His wife and son had to transport him three times a week to a private kidney
center in another town for five hours of dialysis treatment. Furthermore, Spring’s
physical deterioration was accompanied by mental disorientation. His behavior
at home became belligerent and destructive, and he could no longer care for
himself.The crisis in the family increased when his wife suffered a stroke, tem-
porarily losing her ability to speak; the son attributed the stroke to strain and ex-
haustion resulting from his father’s behavior and condition. After Mrs. Spring
became well enough to be discharged from the hospital to her home, she could
no longer take care of her husband. She needed to devote all her energies to tak-
ing care of herself.
At that time Spring was in a nursing home, where his disruptive behavior was
controlled through heavy sedation.The wife and son expressed the view that if
Spring were competent to voice his opinion, he would wish to have dialysis dis-
continued, although that would result in his death.The family’s view did not rest
on any expression of such an intention by the patient, but it was accepted.
It seems that the Spring family was very close-knit.The wife and son found
it terribly distressing to see the man they had shared their lives with for so many
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years fading away, failing to recognize them, acting brutally, and becoming a dif-
ferent person.They could not cope with this situation.The appeal to the court
was made also in order to keep their own sanity, their own lives. It seems that
the family sincerely thought that by withholding treatment from Spring, they
could preserve his dignity. But the question remains whether Spring himself
would have preferred to die (Cohen-Almagor 2001).
Even if we are convinced of a family’s commitment to a patient, the family’s
position should not be obligatory in all circumstances.The family is not neces-
sarily capable of rational decision-making, and even if it is, its interests are not
necessarily identical to those of the patient.The patient’s best interests should al-
ways be first and foremost in our mind (Hardwig 1990, 2000; Jennings 1992;
Kushner 2010; Richman 1987).
Conclusion
After a few days of receiving the morphine treatment, SC’s elder son YC arrived
for his weekly visit. He found his mother on the verge of death and enquired
what had happened since he last saw her a week ago.WhenYC understood that
she received morphine treatments, he demanded to transfer her to the near hos-
pital. The attending physician insisted that SC had received appropriate care at
the nursing home and refused to transfer the patient. YC demanded transfer.
After consultation with a senior physician, permission was granted. SC was trans-
ferred to the hospital, where the morphine regime was stopped immediately.
SC’s younger son, who realized that something terribly wrong was going on,
arrived the following day. Both sons demanded that their mother receive heal-
ing treatment. It took 72 hours for SC’s body to clear the morphine.With the
appropriate treatment and counseling, SC resumed her will to live. Upon col-
lecting herself, SC failed to understand why the people at the nursing home
were so quick to grant her request to die. The mere mention of the nursing
home’s name became traumatic to her. A few weeks later, SC underwent an
operation to open blood vessels in her left leg.
This episode raises alarm bells regarding potential abuse of the Dying Patient
Law as it is applied to fragile and vulnerable patients in nursing homes. SC’s
treatment clearly violated the letter and the spirit of Israeli law and would be
considered malpractice elsewhere as well.This episode also teaches us a number
of lessons. First, patients may ask to die because life appears to be the worst alter-
native in the current situation. But the patient should state this wish repeatedly
over a period of time.We must verify that such a request does not stem from a mo-
mentary urge, an impulse, a product of passing depression.We must also verify
that the request is not the result of external influences.
Second, we need to arrive at a level of transparency at which proper safe-
guards for end-of-life medical care can be developed and maintained. At times,
the patient’s decision might be influenced by severe pain (Ruddick 1997; Schat-
Fatal Choices and Flawed Decisions at the End of Life
autumn 2011 • volume 54, number 4 589
11_PBM54.4cohen 578–94:02_51.3schwartz 320–  10/6/11  11:10 AM  Page 589
man 2007;Teno et al. 2001;Wall 2002). In this context, the role of palliative care
can be crucial, and it need not lead to the patient’s death. By palliative care is
meant the active, comprehensive, and total care of patients whose disease is not
responsive to curative treatment, where maintaining that control of pain, of other
symptoms, and of psychological, social, and spiritual problems, is paramount
(WHO 1990). One important safeguard should be proper documentation of the
use of potentially life-shortening measures, including keeping records on the
timing and doses of the drug and the physician’s intention at each step. Such
documentation may reduce the use of inappropriate large doses of medications
to shorten the patient’s life given in the guise of relieving pain and suffering
(Sprung 2008).
Ganzini and colleagues (2000) report that as a result of palliative care, some
patients in Oregon changed their minds about assisted suicide (see also Morrison
and Meier 2004).The medical staff must examine whether it is possible to pre-
vent or to ease the pain by means of medication and palliative care.3 The Oregon
Death with Dignity Act (13 Or. Rev. Stat. §3.01, 1998) requires the attending
physician to inform the patient of all feasible alternatives, including comfort care
and pain control (Cohen-Almagor and Hartman 2001). If it is possible to pre-
vent or to ease the patient’s pain, then the patient’s request to die should not be
fulfilled; instead, the necessary treatment should be prescribed.
Third, coping with pain and suffering can drain all of the patient’s emotional
strength, exhausting the ability to deal with other issues. In cases of competent
patients, the assumption is that the patient understands the meaning of the deci-
sion. A psychologist’s assessment is crucial in the process.There should be attend-
ing psychologists in nursing homes and hospital wards to speak with patients,
discuss their condition, and assess their mental capabilities and ability to make
fatal decisions at the end of life. Psychologists can confirm whether the patient
is able to make a decision of such ultimate significance to the patient’s life, and
whether the decision is truly that of the patient, expressed consistently and of
her own free will. Most importantly, the role of psychologists is of vital impor-
tance in providing comprehensive primary care for patients with multiple
chronic conditions. It is worthwhile to hold several such conversations, separated
by a few days. The patient’s loved ones and the attending physician should be
included in at least one of the conversations.
Fourth, it is reiterated that physicians should invest time in their patients.The
specialization process is such that physicians see only the organ in which they
specialize. Some see only the heart, others the liver, yet others the lungs. No one
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sees the patient as a whole, as a human being who needs to preserve hope and
understand his condition. Physicians need to understand that time is a worth-
while investment, as physician-patient direct communication is crucial in the
healing and caring process. “Direct communication” entails verbal communica-
tion, active listening, voice management, nonverbal communication, and cultural
awareness (McCullagh and Wright 2008; Tamparo and Lindh 2007). Without
such communication, patients are in a limbo—uncertain, afraid, not knowing
what to expect, victims of their worst speculations and nightmares. On the other
hand, positive communication with patients addressing all of the patient’s health-
related needs and concerns can decrease patient anxieties, increase patient trust,
and result in a constructive experience for all involved. The patient must be
informed of the situation and the prognosis for recovery or escalation of the dis-
ease, with the suffering that it may involve.There must be a free flow of infor-
mation and coordination between patients and all who provide care for the pa-
tients, including specialist physicians, rehabilitation therapists, mental health
professionals, home care providers, and social workers (Boult and Wieland
2010).The communication should be two ways, where physicians not only talk
but also listen to their patients.What does the patient want? Why does she want
this? Listening to the narrative may reveal misconceptions or misunderstanding
that can be corrected; alternatively, the narrative may affirm that the patient
knows exactly what she wants because of valid reasons.
Fifth, it must be ensured that the patient’s decision is not a result of familial
and environmental pressures.The patients’ motives should be evaluated closely so
as to see to what extent they are affected by various external pressures (as op-
posed to a truly free will to die).A situation could exist in which the patient is
under no such pressure, but still does not wish to be a burden on others. Ob-
viously, we cannot say that the feelings of patients toward their loved ones are
not relevant to the decision-making process (Casarett 2010; Cohen-Almagor
1996; Hardwig 2005).
Sixth, the decision-making process should include a second opinion in order
to verify the diagnosis and minimize the chances of misdiagnosis, as well as to
allow the discovery of other medical options.A specialist who is not dependent
on the first doctor, either professionally or otherwise, should provide the second
opinion. Furthermore, the consulting physician must verify that the patient is
capable, is acting voluntarily, and has made an informed decision.
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